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Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine the role of information and communication technology in 
complementing information sharing bureaus (or private credit bureaus and public credit 
registries) for financial sector competition. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector 
competition are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization 
and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 
2004-2011 and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal 
deviations. The findings differ across financial sectors in terms of marginal, net and threshold 
effects. By introducing the concept of financialization, the study unites two streams of research 
by: improving the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding 
to an evolving field of development literature by means of informal finance. Moreover, a 
practical method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing information asymmetry on 
various financial sectors is suggested. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 Information asymmetry (IA) between lenders and borrowers can substantially constraint 
access to finance in the banking industry. From a theoretical viewpoint, information sharing 
bureaus (ISB) are expected to reduce IA. Information and communication technology (ICT) is an 
instrument by which ISB mitigate IA by stimulating competition within the financial sector. 
Though, a strand of recent African financial development literature has emphasised the need for 
ISB in reducing IA for financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014), another strand of the literature is 
articulating the view that ISB may not be stimulating competition in the banking sector for 
enhanced financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a). According to the narrative, financial 
institutions with substantial market influence could be using information from ISB to enjoy a 
‘quiet life’2 because of lack of competition within the financial sector.   
 In addition to the above factors, there are three underlying motivations for positioning an 
inquiry on the relationship between ICT, reducing IA and financial sector competition in Africa, 
namely: (i) growing prospects of ICT penetration on the continent; (ii) gaps in the IA literature 
and (iii) introduction of previously unexplored dimensions of financialization within the 
framework of financial sector competition.  
 First, the relevance of ICT is twofold. According to Penard et al. (2012), the continent is 
experiencing an uneven development in mobiles phones vis-à-vis the internet. As of 2010, the 
internet (mobile phone) penetration rate was 9.6% (41%). On the other hand, the authors 
maintain that whereas ICT penetration has reached saturation points in developed economies, 
there is still much space for its improvement in Africa. In essence, whereas high-end markets in 
North America, Asia and Europe are experiencing growth-stabilization in ICT, Africa represents 
substantial business opportunities for ICT development.  
 Second, a recent stream of literature is consistent with the narrative that, the introduction 
of ISB about twelve years ago across the continent was primarily motivated by the need to 
address the policy syndrome of surplus liquidity in financial institutions (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; 
                                                          
2
 ‘Quiet life’ is the short form of the ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH). According to Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010) 
and Asongu and Odhiambo (2018a), the QLH is a supposition that banks with comparatively higher market power 
would use their advantages to grant less credit to borrowers, but instead exploit such opportunities for high profit 
margins or a ‘quiet life’.  
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Asongu et al., 2016b)3. The ISB are destined to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
financial industry. Notable ISB have included public credit registries (PCR) and private credit 
bureaus (PCB)4. Financial access issues related to IA that the ISB are designed to mitigate 
include: affordability, eligibility to bank lending and physical access (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010).  
 Despite the severe concerns of financial access in African financial institutions, the 
literature related on IA in the banking industry of the continent is very limited. For instance, 
Barth et al. (2009) have focused on nine African countries, Love and Mylenko (2003) on four, 
and Galindo and Miller (2001) on none. More recently, Asongu et al. (2016a, 2016b) have 
assessed 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011 while Triki and Gajigo (2014) have 
investigated 42 countries for the period 2006-2009. This inquiry is closest to the last-three 
studies that have used PCR and PCB as proxies for reducing IA. We steer clear of the stream of 
literature which has been oriented towards financial access by focusing on financial sector 
competition. The positioning of the inquiry is also in response to recommendations for more 
scholarly research on the outcomes of ISB on the continent (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13).  
 Third, this study introduces previously unexplored concepts of financialization within the 
framework of financial sector competition because to the best of our knowledge such has not 
been engaged by both broad (Galindo & Miller, 2001; Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010; 
Houston et al., 2010) and African-specific IA (Singh et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu 
et al., 2016a) literature.  A possible reason for this missing dimension could be that ISB data is 
unavailable before 2004. Furthermore, recent financial development literature on competition 
within the banking sector has focused for the most part on bank participation and bank 
concentration (O’Toole, 2014; Asongu, 2015a). By introducing the concept of financialization 
(which is discussed in-depth in Section 2), the study unites two streams of research by: 
improving the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding to 
an evolving field of development literature by means of informal finance. Moreover, a 
practicable method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing IA on various financial 
sectors is suggested by the study. Whereas a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the 
relationship between reforms in the financial sector and access to finance (Arestis et al., 2002; 
Batuo & Kupukile, 2010), the role of the informal financial sector has often by neglected (see 
                                                          
3
 The interested reader can find more insights into concerns about surplus liquidity in Saxegaard (2006) and Fouda 
(2009).  
4
 In this inquiry ‘PCR and PCB’ and ISB are used interchangeably. 
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Meagher, 2013; Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi et al., 2012). The propositions on financial sector 
competition which this study uses challenge the mainstream narrative in three principal areas, 
notably, they: (i) provide a definition of the financial system that integrates the missing informal 
financial sector; (ii) disentangle the existing definition into its formal and semi-formal 
components and (iii) introduce the notion of financialization within the perspective of financial 
sector competition.  
 The rest of the study is organised in the following manner. The theoretical underpinnings, 
propositions and related literature are provided in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are provided in Section 4 while 
Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature  
 Two principal theoretical perspectives dominate the relationship between reducing IA 
and financial development (Claus & Grimes, 2003; Asongu et al., 2016b). The first is concerned 
with the manner in which the risk features of bank assets are transformed whereas the second 
focuses on channels through which liquidity made available by financial institutions can be 
enhanced. The two branches of the literature however, accord with the view that the fundamental 
goal of financial institutions is to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic 
operators. The efficiency of resource mobilisation can be boosted by ISB through inter alia: 
reducing the cost of and constraints to credit and increasing competition within the financial 
sector (see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). This inquiry is more focused on the latter: how ISB 
influence competition within the financial sector.  
 The highlighted perspectives are broadly in accordance with foremost studies on the 
relevance of reducing IA for financial development, namely: credit rationing models (Jaffee & 
Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986); diversification with financial 
intermediaries (Diamond, 1984); communication by banks to investors on potential borrowers 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977) and ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry (Diamond & Dybvig, 
1983).  Much recent studies are consistent with theoretical perspective that ISB enhance 
financial access through competition within the financial sector (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; 
Asongu et al., 2016a). In this study, financial sector competition is measured by addressing 
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setbacks in the definition of the financial system by the International Financial Statistics (IFS, 
2008) that has neglected the informal financial sector (Asongu, 2014a).  
  
Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits5  here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits6 are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)7 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)8. 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)9. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ 
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 10 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector 
importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one 
sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015a).   
 
                                                          
5
 Lines 24 and 25 of the International Financial Statistics (October 2008).  
6
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the International Financial Statistics (2008).  
7
 “Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in 
undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking 
system.  Here we define ‘financial formalization’ as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in 
circulation” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
8
 “This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal 
and informal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432). 
9
 “This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of 
formal and semi-formal sectors” (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432).  
10
 “The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, 
meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal 
sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation”  (Asongu, 
2015a, p. 432).  
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Table 1 presents propositions that build on shortcomings of the IFS’s definition. The 
propositions which incorporate the missing informal financial sector have been employed in 
recent African literature on financial sector competition (Asongu, 2015a, 2015b; Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2018b; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2017; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). While Panel A 
presents indicators of financial sector that are based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), those 
suggested in Panel B are associated with competition for shares in money supply (M2) within the 
financial sector. Some previously unemployed notions are substantially articulated in the 
propositions, namely, notions of financial: formalization, informalization, semi-formalization 
and non-formalization. In essence, the concept of financialization articulates the progress of one 
financial sector to the detriment of one or more financial sectors. For instance, financial 
formalization denotes the improvements of money supply shares of the formal financial sector, 
to the detriment of other financial sectors, namely: the informal and semi-formal sectors.  
The literature on reducing IA for financial access has for the most part been focused on 
developed countries and the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America, whereas the 
African continent has not been given the scholarly attention it disserves (Asongu et al., 2016a). 
The broader literature on IA has revolved around two principal themes: the role of IA between 
creditors on the one hand and the impacts of creditors’ rights on strengthened information 
sharing channels. Accordingly, one stream of studies has focused fundamentally on the 
importance of stronger creditors’ rights in: risk-taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya 
et al., 2011) and bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & 
Unlu, 2009). Another stream of literature is oriented towards assessing how reducing IA could: 
reduce default rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); increase access to finance (Djankov et al., 2007; 
Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014); reduce credit cost (Brown et al., 2009); affect 
antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012); influence lending linked to corruption (Barth et al., 
2009) and affect bank loans that are syndicated (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010).  
From a macroeconomic angle, the issue about reducing IA has been investigated by 
Galindo and Miller (2001) who have established that, relative to less developed countries, 
developed nations which are characterised with ISB are associated with fewer financial access 
restrictions. According to the narrative, high performing PCR substantially contribute towards 
the reducing sensitivity by enterprises to investment decisions for ‘availability of cash flow’ 
which is used to proxy for constraints in access to finance. Love and Mylenko (2000) have used 
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ISB to assess if reducing IA between banks and perception managers affect financial credit 
constraints to establish that credit registries are negatively linked to financial credit constraints. 
The authors have established that while PCR do not considerably reduce constraints in financial 
access, PCB are linked to higher levels in access to finance. Barth et al. (2009) conclude that: 
corrupt-oriented lending is mitigated by banking competition and ‘corrupt lending’ is 
considerably influenced by firm competition, the legal environment and the structure of 
ownership in firms and banks.  
Triki and Gajigo (2014) have recently assessed the role of ISB on financial access, 
notably: the effect of ISB on firms’ access to finance and how the design of ISB affects 
constraints in access to finance. They have concluded that: (i) substantial cross-country 
disparities exist in financial constraints and the design of ISB with PCR and (ii) financial access 
is higher in nations with PCB, compared to their counterparts with PCR or no ISB. Asongu et al. 
(2016a) have examined reducing IA policy thresholds by which financial development can be 
enhanced to establish conflicting findings whereas Asongu et al. (2016b) have investigated the 
impacts of ISB throughout the conditional distributions of financial development. They have 
concluded that initial levels of financial development substantially affect the incremental benefits 
of financial access from the introduction of PCR and PCB.  
As documented in the introduction, the present inquiry complements the discussed 
literature by: engaging the missing dimension of financial sector competition in the IA literature 
and introducing the role of ICT in the relationship between reducing IA and financial sector 
competition.  
  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank for the period 2004-2011. It is important to note that data on PCR and PCB are only 
available from 2004 while the latest date in the FDSD is 2011. The scope of Africa is in 
accordance with the stylized facts discussed earlier, notably: the scarce literature on the 
relationship between reducing IA and financial development on the one hand and on the other 
hand, severe financial access constraints across the continent.  
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 The financial sector competition indicators proposed in Table 1 are computed from the 
FDSD of the World Bank. Consistent with recent African literature, information sharing proxies 
used to decrease IA are private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) (see Triki 
& Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b). Three financial sector measurements are used namely: 
informal financial development (Propositions 3 and 7); formal financial development 
(Propositions 1 and 5); and non-formal financial development (Propositions 4 and 8). Semi-
formal financial development (Propositions 2 and 6) is not employed because of constraints in 
degrees of freedom.  
 We employ six control variables to account for concerns in variable omission bias: the 
lagged dependent variable, public investment, foreign aid, trade, inflation and GDP growth. The 
choice of these variables for the conditioning information set is in accordance with the financial 
development literature (see Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 2014b; Asongu et 
al., 2018). The control variables are limited to six because results from a pilot study or 
preliminary investigation reveal that controlling for more than six variables leads to instrument 
proliferation.  
 Foreign aid is theoretically expected to increase financial development because its 
purpose is to reduce the saving-investment gap that less developed countries face (Easterly, 
2005). From a pragmatic perspective however, development assistance may also negatively 
affect financial development if inter alia: a substantial portion does not reach destination 
countries or reaches recipient countries but is immediately siphoned by corrupt officials and 
deposited in tax havens under the jurisdictions of developed countries.  The positive nexus 
between finance and economic prosperity has been substantially documented (see Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1992; Saint-Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997;  Jaffee & Levonian 2001). Accordingly, 
economic growth is positively associated with financial development through, among others: 
enhanced availability of financial resources for investment purposes and increased competition 
within the banking sector (see Huang, 2011). Theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) and 
empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) studies accord with the view that very high inflation is associated 
with inefficient and less active financial institutions. Trade openness has been documented to be 
positively linked to financial development (see Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang &Temple, 2005). 
It is important to also note that the engaged variables in the conditioning information set may 
affect the formal and informal financial sectors differently.  
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 Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively disclose the definition (and 
sources), summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables. From the summary statistics, 
it is apparent from mean values that variables are comparable. Moreover, from related standard 
deviations, reasonable estimated nexuses can be expected. The objective of the correlation 
matrix is to control for potential multicollinearity issues. After a preliminary investigation, the 
issues are apparent between indicators of financial sector competition. Fortunately, such issues 
are not of serious nature to bias specifications because the financial sector competition indicators 
are exclusively used in distinct specifications as dependent variables.  
   
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Specification  
 The estimation approach adopted by the study is the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) that employs forward orthogonal deviations. The strategy is the extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009a, 2009b) which has been documented to restrict the 
proliferation of instruments and account for cross-sectional dependence (see Love &  Zicchino, 
2006; Baltagi, 2008). The two main conditions for the application of the estimation strategy are 
also satisfied. First, N>T because the number of time series (T=8) is less than the number of 
cross sections (N=53). Second, there is persistence in the dependent or financial sector 
competition variables because as shown in Appendix 4, their correlations with corresponding 
lags are higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 (Tchamyou et al., 2018)  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
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where, tiFSC ,
 
 is the financial sector competition (formal, informal and non-formal finances) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of autoregression ;  ISB , 
Information Sharing Bureaus (PCR or PCB); ICT , information and communication technology 
(mobile phone or internet penetration); Inter , interaction between ISB and ICT;
 
W  is the vector 
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of five control variables  (inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade and foreign aid),
 
i
 
is 
the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the 
specifications, a two-step process is adopted because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. 
Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls surrounding interactive regressions: (i) all 
constitutive variables are included in the specifications and (ii) the impact of the modifying 
policy variables (or ICT) are interpreted as conditional marginal impacts.  
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
 Consistent with recent literature (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & De Moor, 
2017; Tchamyou, 2018a, 2018b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018), all 
independent variables are suspected endogenous or predetermined. Therefore, the gmmstyle is 
considered for the predetermined variables whereas only years are treated as strictly exogenous. 
Moreover, the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is not very 
likely for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). 
 In order to tackle the concern of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as 
instruments for forward-differenced variables. Accordingly, Helmet transformations are 
performed for the regressors in order on remove fixed effects that are susceptible of affecting the 
investigated nexuses (see Asongu & De Moor, 2017). These underlying transformations consist 
of forward mean-differencing of the variables: instead of subtracting the previous observations 
for the contemporaneous one, the mean of lead observations are subtracted from the variables 
(Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). The transformations enable orthogonal or parallel conditions between 
lagged and forward-differenced values. In order to limit the loss of data, irrespective of lag 
numbers, the underlying transformations are computed for observations, with the exception of 
the last observation for each country.  “And because lagged observations do not enter the 
formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman 2009b, p. 104). 
 We further argue that the instruments that exhibit strict exogeneity can influence the 
dependent variable exclusively through explaining variables. The statistical importance of the 
exclusion restriction is established with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument 
exogeneity.  Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of the test should be rejected for the 
instruments to elucidate the dependent variable exclusively via the endogenous explaining 
variables.  
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 In the standard instrumental variable (IV) procedure, a rejection of the alternative 
hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments 
explain the dependent variable exclusively via investigated mechanisms or explaining variables. 
While this information criterion has been used in the IV literature (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016), in the GMM approach (with forward orthogonal deviations), the DHT is 
used to assess if years exhibit strict exogeneity: by explaining financial sector competition 
exclusively via the proposed endogenous explaining variables or proposed channels. Hence, 
when reporting the findings, the validity of the exclusion restriction is confirmed when the 
alternative hypothesis of DHT related to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 respectively present findings corresponding to formal, 
informal and non-formal financial developments. Each table is displayed in two categories: the 
left-hand-side (LHS) shows results related to GDP-based indicators while the right-hand-side 
(RHS) presents findings linked to money supply (M2)-oriented measurements of 
financialization. Four post-estimation diagnostic tests are used to assess the validity of models 
(Asongu & De Moor, 2017)11.  
 The findings are discussed in three levels, namely, with respect to: marginal impacts, net 
impacts and thresholds. The net impacts with ICT are computed with the unconditional and 
marginal effects from ISB. For instance, in the second column of Table 2, the marginal effect 
(from the interaction) is 0.003 while the unconditional impact of PCR is -0.420. The 
corresponding net effect of PCR with mobile phones is -0.310 ([36.659×0.003] + -0.420)12.  
Given that the marginal effect is positive, the corresponding ICT positive threshold at which the 
negative unconditional effect changes from negative to positive is 140 (0.420/0.003). The 
                                                          
11
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions 
that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust 
but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict 
identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number 
of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments 
isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity 
of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
12
 36.659 is the mean value of mobile phones.  
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positive threshold is feasible because it is within the mobile phone range (minimum to 
maximum) disclosed by the summary statistics (0.241 to 171.51).  
 The following findings can be established in Table 2 on linkages between ICT, formal 
finance and information asymmetry. First, it is not possible to derive valid inferences from the 
RHS of Table 2 because at the 1% significance level, post-estimation autocorrelation is still 
apparent in the residuals. Second, the marginal effect from the interaction between PCR and 
mobile phones is positive; the corresponding net effect is negative while the positive threshold is 
within range. Third, whereas the marginal effects from the interactions between ICT and PCB is 
negative, the net effects of PCB with ICT is positive, while the  corresponding negative 
thresholds are not within the ranges disclosed by the summary statistics. Fourth, the significant 
control variables have expected signs. 
In Table 3 on linkages between ICT, informal finance and information asymmetry, 
autocorrelation is apparent in the RHS and three specifications of the LHS. The following 
findings can be established. First, the marginal impact from the interaction between PCR and 
internet is positive; the corresponding net effect is negative while the positive threshold of 41 is 
within the internet penetration range (0.031 to 51.00).  Second, most of the control variables are 
significant with expected signs.  
Given the high correlation between informal finance and non-formal finance, we 
complement the findings in Table 3 with those of Table 4 on nexuses between ICT, non-formal 
finance and information asymmetry. The following findings can be established. First, like with 
previous tables, valid inferences cannot be established from the RHS because at the 1% 
significance level, post-estimation autocorrelation is still apparent in the residuals. Second, the 
marginal effect from the interaction between ISB and ICT is positive; the net effects are negative 
while the corresponding positive thresholds are within range. Third, most of the significant 
control variables have expected signs. 
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Table 2: Formal finance, ICT and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Dependent variable : Formal Financial Development  
         
 Formal Financial Development (Prop.1)  Financial Development Formalization (Prop.5) 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -1.987 -2.335*** -2.825*** 0.899 -0.074*** -0.055*** -0.049** -0.054*** 
 (0.123) (0.008) (0.000) (0.493) (0.003) (0.000) (0.016) (0.006) 
Prop.1 (-1) 1.060*** 0.980*** 1.003*** 1.005*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Prop. 5  (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.078*** 1.048*** 1.047*** 1.057*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.420*** --- -0.043 --- -0.0002 --- 0.0005** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.303)  (0.571)  (0.026)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.129*** --- 0.125*** --- -0.0002** --- -0.0004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.000) 
Mobile Phones  -0.044*** -0.006 --- --- -0.00006 -0.00003 --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.619)   (0.323) (0.612)   
Internet  --- --- -0.034 -0.013 --- --- -0.0003 -0.0006*** 
   (0.302) (0.494)   (0.209) (0.000) 
PCR ×Mobile Phones 0.003*** --- --- --- 0.000003 --- --- --- 
 (0.002)    (0.491)    
PCB ×Mobile Phones --- -0.001*** --- --- --- 0.000001 --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.149)   
PCR ×Internet --- --- -0.002 --- --- --- -0.00001 --- 
   (0.182)    (0.192)  
PCB ×Internet --- --- --- -0.010*** --- --- --- 0.00003*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.043** 0.046*** 0.012 0.033*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.369) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.076*** 0.00004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.853) (0.582) (0.543) (0.140) 
Public Investment  -0.134*** -0.169*** -0.173*** -0.199*** 0.0009*** 0.0006** 0.0009*** 0.0008** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.025) 
Foreign Aid  0.108*** 0.178*** 0.058* 0.036 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0008** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.060) (0.402) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
Trade  0.066*** 0.057*** 0.052*** 0.027** -0.00003 0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.736) (0.581) (0.477) (0.845) 
         
Net Effect with Mobile Phones -0.310 0.092 --- --- na na --- --- 
Net Effect with the Internet  --- --- na 0.056 --- --- na -0.0001 
Thresholds of ICT (-/+) 140(+) 129(-) na 12.50(-) na na na 13.33(-) 
         
AR(1) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.130) (0.159) (0.188) (0.170) 
AR(2) (0.496) (0.452) (0.540) (0.377) (0.031) (0.038) (0.032) (0.028) 
Sargan OIR (0.621) (0.001) (0.444) (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.020) 
Hansen OIR (0.317) (0.209) (0.245) (0.281) (0.193) (0.245) (0.338) (0.240) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.137) (0.115) (0.347) (0.622) (0.636) (0.475) (0.473) (0.831) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.561) (0.421) (0.249) (0.170) (0.100) (0.190) (0.287) (0.088) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.414) (0.425) (0.335) (0.760) (0.081) (0.201) (0.111) (0.158) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.229) (0.091) (0.208) (0.027) (0.837) (0.471) (0.996) (0.605) 
         
Fisher  70429.9*** 172883*** 90986.6*** 23620.9*** 2942.32*** 844152*** 2002.14*** 1.2e+06*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  257 258 255 256 257 258 255 256 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.   
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Table 3: Informal finance, ICT and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Dependent variable : Informal Financial Development  
         
 Informal Financial Development (Prop.3)  Financial Development Informalization (Prop.7) 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -1.319*** -1.127*** -0.198 -2.627*** -0.030*** 0.0002 -0.024** -0.021** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.687) (0.000) (0.003) (0.984) (0.031) (0.046) 
Prop.3 (-1) 1.056*** 1.090*** 1.083*** 1.082*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Prop.7 (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.998*** 1.027*** 1.027*** 1.038*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.171*** --- -0.123*** --- -0.0005 --- -0.001*** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.170)  (0.000)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.006 --- -0.012 --- 0.000005 --- 0.0003*** 
  (0.148)  (0.131)  (0.953)  (0.001) 
Mobile Phones  -0.005** -0.008*** --- --- -0.0001* -0.0001 --- --- 
 (0.018) (0.001)   (0.090) (0.118)   
Internet  --- --- -0.018*** -0.027*** --- --- 0.0003* 0.0004*** 
   (0.001) (0.009)   (0.081) (0.001) 
PCR ×Mobile Phones 0.001*** --- --- --- 0.000003 --- --- --- 
 (0.001)    (0.369)    
PCB ×Mobile Phones --- 0.00007** --- --- --- 0.0000004 --- --- 
  (0.011)    (0.763)   
PCR ×Internet --- --- 0.003*** --- --- --- 0.00002*** --- 
   (0.001)    (0.004)  
PCB ×Internet --- --- --- 0.002*** --- --- --- -0.00003 
*** 
    (0.001)    (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.042*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.009 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.00008 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.253) (0.042) (0.176) (0.191) (0.587) 
Inflation 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.0001 -0.00007 -0.00004 -0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.626) (0.798) (0.800) (0.065) 
Public Investment  -0.022** -0.017* -0.064*** -0.046*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0006* 
 (0.013) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.000) (0.033) 
Foreign Aid  0.009 0.010 0.023 0.008 -0.003 -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0004 
 (0.367) (0.263) (0.173) (0.505) (0.155) (0.005) (0.005) (0.159) 
Trade  0.018*** 0.014*** 0.011* 0.029*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.293) (0.001) (0.079) 
         
Net Effect with Mobile Phones 0.134 na --- --- na na --- --- 
Net Effect with the  Internet  --- --- -0.102 na --- --- -0.0008 0.00009 
Thresholds of ICT (-/+) 171(+) na 41(+) 6(+) na na 50(+) 10(+) 
         
AR(1) (0.008) (0.155) (0.012) (0.165) (0.133) (0.151) (0.112) (0.173) 
AR(2) (0.089) (0.097) (0.110) (0.084) (0.057) (0.055) (0.041) (0.042) 
Sargan OIR (0.743) (0.447) (0.145) (0.494) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.031) 
Hansen OIR (0.544) (0.713) (0.707) (0.665) (0.163) (0.185) (0.195) (0.103) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.744) (0.446) (0.904) (0.778) (0.363) (0.279) (0.102) (0.647) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.361) (0.753) (0.433) (0.476) (0.147) (0.213) (0.420) (0.042) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.634) (0.684) (0.557) (0.546) (0.081) (0.120) (0.053) (0.072) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.300) (0.540) (0.775) (0.699) (0.716) (0.579) (0.989) (0.467) 
         
Fisher  17865.2*** 32600.5*** 40948.8*** 348448*** 1200.55*** 31046.2*** 1491.91*** 47676.5*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  275 276 272 273 257 258 255 256 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and  Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.   
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Table 4: Non-formal finance, ICT and Information Asymmetry   
         
 
Dependent variable : Non-formal Financial Development  
         
 Nonformal Financial Development (Prop.4)  Financial Development Non-formalization (Prop.8) 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -1.551*** -1.386*** -0.831 -2.315*** -0.022* -0.0003 -0.018** -0.025** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.192) (0.000) (0.072) (0.978) (0.034) (0.044) 
Prop.4 (-1) 1.043*** 1.086*** 1.058*** 1.072*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Prop.8  (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.118*** 1.068*** 1.063*** 1.060*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.213*** --- -0.130*** --- -0.00007 --- -0.0007*** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.897)  (0.004)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.005 --- -0.007 --- 0.0003*** --- 0.0005*** 
  (0.288)  (0.355)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Mobile Phones  -0.004* -0.004 --- --- 0.0001** 0.00007 --- --- 
 (0.092) (0.112)   (0.017) (0.272)   
Internet  --- --- -0.014* -0.016 --- --- 0.0004* 0.0007*** 
   (0.096) (0.185)   (0.091) (0.000) 
PCR ×Mobile Phones 0.002*** --- --- --- -0.0000005 --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.911)    
PCB ×Mobile Phones --- 0.00004 --- --- --- -0.000002 --- --- 
  (0.282)    (0.101)   
PCR ×Internet --- --- 0.003*** --- --- --- 0.00001 --- 
   (0.000)    (0.191)  
PCB ×Internet --- --- --- 0.001*** --- --- --- -0.00003 
*** 
    (0.006)    (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.031*** 0.018** 0.020* 0.006 -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.055) (0.418) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.00003*** 0.00004*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** -0.00006 -0.00002 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.811) (0.948) (0.653) (0.209) 
Public Investment  -0.014 -0.022* -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.00009 
*** 
-0.0008*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.201) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
Foreign Aid  0.014 0.009 -0.024 0.017 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004* 
 (0.180) (0.349) (0.182) (0.217) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) 
Trade  0.019*** 0.015*** 0.011* 0.031*** 0.0001 -0.00004 0.0002*** 0.0002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.423) (0.725) (0.005) (0.069) 
         
Net Effect with Mobile Phones -0.139 na --- --- na na --- --- 
Net Effect with the  Internet  --- --- -0.109 na --- --- na 0.0002 
Thresholds of ICT (-/+) 106.5(+) na 43.33(+) 16(+) na na na 16.66(-) 
         
AR(1) (0.006) (0.147) (0.009) (0.159) (0.153) (0.162) (0.224) (0.191) 
AR(2) (0.147) (0.110) (0.179) (0.108) (0.027) (0.037) (0.029) (0.025) 
Sargan OIR (0.587) (0.367) (0.087) (0.325) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.048) 
Hansen OIR (0.286) (0.535) (0.364) (0.551) (0.161) (0.214) (0.225) (0.157) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.807) (0.547) (0.908) (0.838) (0.666) (0.451) (0.539) (0.816) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.121) (0.466) (0.135) (0.315) (0.073) (0.168) (0.149) (0.050) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.389) (0.488) (0.205) (0.431) (0.179) (0.181) (0.102) (0.174) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.211) (0.517) (0.801) (0.670) (0.281) (0.438) (0.823) (0.283) 
         
Fisher  13648.3*** 9186.26*** 25938.3*** 406794*** 3248.02*** 593145*** 1158.35*** 1.8e+06*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  275 276 272 273 257 258 255 256 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.   
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4.2 Further discussion of results and implications  
4.2.1 Theoretical linkage, nexus with the literature and practical implications  
 ISB are theoretically expected to boost formal financial development and limit informal 
financial development because they are also expected to act as disciplining devices by 
discouraging borrowers from resorting to the informal financial sector as a viable alternative to 
the formal financial sector. While we have observed that ICT interacts with PCB to produce net 
positive effects on formal financial development, the interaction of PCR with the mobile phone 
has a positive marginal effect, albeit a negative net effect. It follows that while ICT is more 
likely to complement PCB in improving formal financial development, the negative net effect 
from the complementarity between PCR and mobile phone can be improved by increasing 
mobile penetration beyond a specific threshold (140). In what follows, we discuss the edge of 
PCB from the angles of existing literature and practical implications.  
 With respect to existing literature, on the one hand, the edge of PCB is broadly in line 
with the findings of Love and Mylenko (2003) who have shown that while the presence of 
private registries are linked to lower financial constraints and higher bank lending share,  the 
impact of public credit registries is less apparent. The findings are also consistent with Triki and 
Gajigo (2014) who have concluded that, compared to PCR, PCB are more positively sensitive to 
finance access. Asongu et al. (2016b) have also found financial development dynamics to 
respond more positively to PCB, compared to PCR. On the other hand, the less positive 
complementarity of PCR with ICT, contrasts with the results of Singh et al. (2009) which 
maintain that PCR in Africa are very likely to enhance financial development. The conclusion by 
Galindo and Miller (2001) that credit registries are better drivers of financial development 
compared to credit bureaus is not apparent from the perspective of net effects. Asongu et al. 
(2016a) have established that ISB for the most part negatively affect financial access. The above 
comparisons should be understood in the light of the fact that the engaged studies have 
investigated ‘financial access’ whereas the dimension of our study with which we are engaging 
the comparison is ‘formal financial development’. Hence, as a caveat, ‘formal financial 
development’ may not be directly equitable to ‘financial allocation efficiency’ or ‘enhanced 
financial access’ because ‘formal financial development’ could be the result of increasing liquid 
liabilities or financial system deposits.  
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 From a practical viewpoint, the edge of PCB could be traceable to the six distinctive 
characteristics that PCB enjoy vis-à-vis PCR, namely in terms of: purpose, coverage, status, 
ownership, data sources used and terms of access. (1) Whereas PCR entail public institutions 
which are set-up with the principal mission of banking sector supervision, PCB on the other hand 
are created fundamentally because of the need of and demand for information from borrowers. 
(2) While the coverage of PCR is provided for the most part by large corporations and limited as  
concerns the nature of information, PCB evolve beyond big corporations to incorporate 
information corporations with rich and longer histories like small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). (3) While PCB are for profit, PCR are not for profit-making. (4) The propriety of PCB 
incorporates lending associations, governments, central banks and other independent parties 
while that of PCR is exclusively limited to central banks and governments. (5) Whereas data 
used by PCR is sourced from both bank and non-bank activities, the data used by PCB entail 
sources of PCR, including courts and tax authorities. (6) PCR access is restricted to data 
providers whereas PCB access to open to all types of lenders. It is apparent from the comparative 
distinctive features that the edge of PCB in complementing ICT to reduce IA for financial sector 
competition may be traceable to inter alia: motivations for creating ISB, data sources and 
performance incentives.   
 
4.2.2 Implications for financial financialization and disciplining of borrowers  
 We have observed that valid inferences could not be established from findings on the 
RHS of Tables 2-4. This implies that the role of ICT in reducing IA does not affect financial 
sector competition. Hence, ISB may not be having the expected impact of reducing the influence 
of banks with high market power, through enhanced banking sector competition. Some channels 
through which ISB could boost banking sector competition include, among others: rendering 
credit markets contestable and mitigating informational rents (see Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 
2019). As a policy implication, in addition to ICT, other complementary mechanisms are needed 
to limit the substantial power that may be enjoyed by certain banks within the financial sector. 
This recommendation aligns with the fact that the substantially documented issues of excess 
liquidity in African banking institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) are partly traceable to 
the lack of competition within the financial sector.  
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 It is also apparent from Tables 3-4 that PCR are more effective in being complemented 
with ICT to negatively affect the informal and non-formal financial sectors. It should be noted 
that ISB also have the mission of playing the role of disciplining borrowers and preventing them 
from defaulting on their debts and/or seeking refuge in the non-formal and informal financial 
sectors. Therefore, the ISB also play a significant role in mitigating moral hazard on the part of 
borrowers. Under this scenario, PCR are more effective at counselling borrowers on the risk of 
reputational loss and resorting to informal finance. As a policy implication, instruments by which 
PCB mitigate IA with the help of ICT need to be improved in order to discipline borrowers more 
effectively.  
 A fundamental implication of this study is that, the complementarity of ISB and ICT 
needs to be encouraged and consolidated in order to enhance financial sector competition and 
ultimately address surplus liquidity concerns in African financial institutions. Such 
complementarity would benefit from more qualified workers and greater information 
synchronisation via among others: regular training of ISB staff; ‘knowledge economy’ (KE)-
driven economic policies; reliable high-speed access to the internet and instrumentation of ICT 
banking services.  
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions  
In this study, we have examined the role of information and communication technology 
(ICT) in complementing information sharing bureaus (ISB) (or private credit bureaus (PCB) and 
public credit registries (PCR)) for financial sector competition. Hitherto unexplored dimensions 
of financial sector competition have been employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of 
formalization, informalization and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on 53 
African countries for the period 2004-2011 and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
with forward orthogonal deviations. The following findings have been established. First, for 
formal financial development: (i) the marginal effect from the interaction between PCR and 
mobile phones is positive; the corresponding net effect is negative while the positive threshold is 
within range and (ii) whereas the marginal effects from the interactions between ICT and PCB 
are negative, the net effects of PCB with ICT are positive, while the corresponding negative 
thresholds are not within ranges. Second, on informal financial development, the marginal 
impact from the interaction between PCR and the internet is positive; the corresponding net 
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effect is negative while the positive threshold is within the internet penetration range. Third, with 
regards to informal financial development, the marginal effect from the interaction between ISB 
and ICT is positive; the net effects are negative while the corresponding positive thresholds are 
within range. Policy implications have been discussed.  
 By introducing the concept of financialization, the study has united two streams of 
research by: improving the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and 
responding to an evolving field of development literature by means of informal finance. 
Moreover, a practical method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing IA on various 
financial sectors is suggested by the study. The findings can be extended by assessing the 
established linkages throughout the conditional distributions of financial sector competition. The 
motivation for the future research direction is that the relevance of established nexuses may be 
contingent on initial levels for competition within the financial sector, such that the linkages 
differ in countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial sector competition.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
  
     
 
 
 
Financial 
Sector 
Development  
Formal Financial Development (Prop.1) 28.037 20.970 2.926 92.325 377 
Semi-formal Financial Development (Prop. 2) 0.199 0.715 0.000 4.478 424 
Informal Financial Development (Prop. 3) 5.350 5.106 -18.89 25.674 424 
Non-formal Financial Development (Prop. 4) 5.550 5.171 -18.89 25.674 424 
Financial Formalization (Prop. 5) 0.773 0.168 0.235 1.469 377 
Financial Semi-formalization (Prop. 6) 0.007 0.029 0.000 0.244 377 
Financial Informalization (Prop. 7) 0.219 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
Financia Non-formalization (Prop. 8) 0.226 0.168 -0.469 0.764 377 
  
     
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0.000 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0.000 64.8 380 
       
ICT Mobile Phone Penetration   36.659 32.848 0.214 171.51 420 
Internet Penetration  6.822 8.852 0.031 51.00 414 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. GDPg: GDP growth. Obs: Observations.  
.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 293) 
     
         
Financial Sector Competition   Info. Asymmetry Control Variables ICT  
Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade Mobile Internet  
1.000 0.110 0.127 0.142 0.565 -0.052 -0.556 -0.565 0.411 0.310 -0.094 -0.071 0.058 -0.311 0.141 0.515 0.687 Prop.1 
 1.000 -0.013 0.130 -0.031 0.872 -0.128 0.031 -0.023 -0.100 -0.060 0.260 -0.040 0.007 -0.086 -0.087 0.064 Prop.2 
  1.000 0.989 -0.604 -0.068 0.617 0.604 0.127 -0.569 -0.083 -0.082 -0.054 0.033 -0.006 -0.055 0.148 Prop.3 
   1.000 -0.604 0.057 0.593 0.604 0.123 -0.579 -0.091 -0.044 -0.059 0.034 -0.018 -0.067 0.156 Prop.4 
    1.000 -0.092 -0.983 -1.000 0.094 0.613 -0.004 0.008 0.128 -0.246 0.119 0.430 0.361 Prop.5 
     1.000 -0.091 0.092 -0.059 -0.084 -0.077 0.289 -0.012 0.123 -0.074 -0.133 -0.044 Prop.6 
      1.000 0.983 -0.083 -0.598 0.018 -0.061 -0.125 0.224 -0.105 -0.407 -0.354 Prop.7 
       1.000 -0.094 -0.613 0.004 -0.008 -0.128 0.246 -0.119 -0.403 -0.361 Prop.8 
        1.000 -0.140 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 0.369 0.437 PCR 
         1.000 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 0.388 0.131 PCB 
          1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 -0.178 -0.099 GDPg 
           1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.054 0.046 Inflation  
            1.000 0.059 0.130 0.079 -0.025 PubIvt 
             1.000 -0.309 -0.504 0.379 NODA 
              1.000 0.198 0.104 Trade 
               1.000 0.631 Mobile 
                1.000 Internet 
                  
Prop.1: Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.2: Semi-Formal Financial Sector Development. Prop.3: Informal Financial Sector Development. Prop. 4: Non-Formal Financial Development. 
Prop.5: Financial Sector Formalization. Prop.6: Financial Sector Semi-Formalization. Prop.7: Financial Sector Informalization. Prop.8: Financial Sector Non-Formalization. Info: Information. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information. ICT: 
Information and Communication Technology.  Mobile:  Mobile Phone Penetration. Internet: Internet Penetration.   
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Formal Financial 
Development  
Prop.1 Bank deposits/GDP. Bank deposits here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money banks (Lines 24 and 25 
of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
Asongu (2014; 
2015ab) 
 
 
   
Semi-formal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 
  (Financial deposits – Bank deposits)/ GDP.    Financial 
deposits are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. (Lines 24, 25 
and 45 of IFS, October, 2008). 
   
Informal  financial 
development 
Prop.3 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/GDP 
   
Informal and semi-formal 
financial development  
Prop.4 (Money  Supply –  Bank deposits)/GDP 
   
Financial intermediary 
formalization 
Prop.5 Bank deposits/ Money Supply (M2). From ‘informal and 
semi-formal’ to formal financial development (formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization’ 
Prop.6 (Financial deposits - Bank deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal financial development 
(Semi-formalization) 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
Prop.7 (Money Supply – Financial deposits)/ Money Supply. From 
‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal financial development 
(Informalisation). 
   
Financial intermediary 
‘semi-formalization and 
informalization’ 
Prop.8 (Money Supply – Bank Deposits)/Money Supply.  Formal to 
‘informal and semi-formal’ financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization). 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information and 
Communication Technology 
Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Internet Internet penetration  (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
         
 Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 
Prop.1(-1) 0.9900        
Prop.2(-1)  0.8801       
Prop.3(-1)   0.9096      
Prop.4(-1)    0.9105     
Prop.5 (-1)     0.9841    
Prop.6(-1)      0.8775   
Prop.7(-1)       0.9855  
Prop.8(-1)        0.9841 
         
Prop.1 (-1): Lagged value of Proposition 1.  
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